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Gretlund calls 'The Lagniappe,' but the chapter might as well have been placed in the 
previous section in that the writers mentioned here share the thematic concerns that 
Gretlund labels 'existential.' 'New Frames of Southern Mind' offers an overview of some 
fifteen Southern writers of fiction currently publishing. The essay takes the form of a status 
report, and Gretlund likes what he sees: 'The writers referred to in this chapter exemplify 
the continuity, change, and excellence of Southern fiction in the 1980s, and their output 
was impressive' (261). 
The last essay in the collection Gretlund calls 'Frames of Southern History, Biography, 
and Fiction.' Here Gretlund addresses the growing awareness in the academic community 
of the collapse of genre boundaries between historiography, biography and fiction. In the 
first part of the essay he rehearses, and supports, the view of Hayden White et al. that a 
writer of history of necessity has to make use of the narrative strategies of fiction to make 
readerly sense, historiographers' insistence on non-fictional 'objectivity' notwithstanding. 
The second part provides good illustrations of how a writer of biography1 autobiography - 
in casu Eudora Welty in One Writer's Beginning - does the same. These viewpoints are 
well established in the literature by now and will raise few objections. However, the last 
part of the essay, where Gretlund seeks to demonstrate why 'without pleasure, [he has] 
found that modern fiction is (autojbiography' (274), he is a little less convincing. His 
views here seem somewhat sweeping and are less cogently argued and illustrated than in 
the first two parts of the essay. 
Each of Gretlund's seventeen chapters has a small preface which explains the 
circumstances that produced the text in question; read together these prefaces constitute a 
form of autobiography of the author as Southern scholar and tell of a varied activity as 
researcher, speaker and commentator, editor, and conference organizer. Frames of 
Southern Mind is only one of the many fruits of that labor. The book suffers here and there 
from repetitions and overlap, which must be ascribed to the fact that these essays were 
written over a long period of time, for a number of disparate occasions. Some minor 
misgivings noted along the way notwithstanding, this remains a highly stimulating book. 
Gretlund has an impressive grasp of his materials. He convinces both in his close readings 
and in his ability to survey the larger field. The fact that he is never afraid of taking a 
strong stance vis-i-vis writers and issues should be productive of fruitful debate. 
Per Winther University of Oslo 
Walter L Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold Wac 1945-1961 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 283 pp., ISBN 0-312-17680-5, paper; $17.95. 
Historian Walter L. Hixson, author of a study of cold war diplomat and ideologue George 
F. Kennan, argues in this book that information and culture played a decisive role in 
bringing down the Soviet Union and its satellites. 'Infiltration' - Hixson curiously insists 
on keeping the cold-war term - of American ideology and culture into the USSR and 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War has been neglected by traditional diplomatic histories 
of the Cold War, he suggests. Hixson acknowledges that such comparative neglect of the 
contribution of American culture to the collapse of Soviet communism reflects the fact that 
State Department diplomats and functionaries took a dim view of the political significance 
of cultural contacts with the Soviet Union during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. The maintenance of the economic and military superiority of the United 
States was the primary objective and all dealings with the Soviets should proceed on the 
basis that the Soviets understood and accepted that fact. 
Propaganda conducted especially by radio grew out of war-time experience, when it 
was known as 'psychological warfare.' The outgoing Truman administration had 
requisitioned a report from MIT and Harvard on how to 'wage total cold war.' 
Appropriately entitled 'Project Troy,' this collaboration between the elite universities and 
the national security bureaucracy was seen as exemplary by State Department officials. On 
the basis of the scholarly recommendations a Psychology Strategy Board was set up in 
1951 with the task of uniting the national security bureaucracy in a campaign of 
psychological warfare. The Board, manned by personnel from the State Department, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to submit recommendations 
to the National Security Council. The underlying assumption of 'psychological warfare' 
strategies was that the peoples of Eastern Europe were discontented with Soviet rule, and 
the goal was to stir up disaffection and ultimately rebellion against Communist oppression. 
Anti-Communist propaganda was beamed into the Soviet zone by the Voice of America 
(VOA), Radio Liberation (RL) and Radio Free Europe (RFE). Each country was targeted 
separately in its own national language spoken by refugees, escapees and others, often 
fanatically anti-Communist. Some of the more vulgar and vituperative propaganda was 
conducted not by VOA but by the Munich-based stations RL and RFE; officially 'private' 
stations but funded by the CIA and with boards answerable to the State Department. 
On Eisenhower's initiative a United States Information Agency (now USIS) was created 
in 1953. Hixson argues that its creation was somewhakagainst the wishes of the State 
Department. However, although the director would report directly to the president and the 
National Security Council, the new agency would be subject to policy guidance by the 
State Department. In a classic example of Orwellian Newspeak the mission of the USIA 
was stated as that of persuading 'foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take 
actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States' (26). 
The de facto subordination of USIA was indicated by its continual complaints about 
inadequate funding and its submission to demands that it maintain an Index of 'subversive' 
literature during the height of the McCarthy rampage. Thus USIA libraries were asked to 
remove such highly esteemed novels as Mailer's The Naked and the Dead, Jones' From 
Here to Eternity, and Ellison's Invisible Man. 
Hixson's central argument is that aggressive psychological 'warfare' broadcasts were 
exposed as so much irresponsible hot air in 1956 when both the US and NATO passively 
stood by as Soviet troops 'd~owned the Budapest uprising in blood,' as the headmaster at 
my school memorably put it to us in his morning address. In Hixson's scenario control 
over W E  and VOA subsequently tightened, as when the US began to encourage national 
communism particularly in Poland. The anti-Polish programs of the 'private' RFE radio 
station were summarily transformed into pro-Gomulka broadcasts. VOA turned to 
exclusive English-language broadcasts of news and entertainment. Its famous 'Music 
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USA' program was actually launched as early as 1955. Emceed by Willis Conover, it 
became one of the most popular VOA programs.' 
Hixson wants to document a movement in American cold war propaganda away from 
strident anti-communist rhetoric towards an emphasis upon the enviable American Way of 
Life as something that ought to and could be made available to all people in the world once 
they committed themselves to liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. He attaches 
particular importance to the American contribution to the 1958 Brussels World Fair, to the 
1958 cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to the 
subsequent American National Exhibition in Moscow the following year. For the Brussels 
Exhibition Hixson relies on Robert Rydell's World of Fairs (1993) as well as archival 
material containing USIA officials' reports. Hixson argues that in both exhibitions the 
Americans were anxious tot counter Soviet criticism of class exploitation and the 
disfranchisement of African-Americans. Thus in Brussels the American show was sold as 
'People's Capitalism' (in the United States there is only one class: the Middle Class). 
Hixson deals extensively with the 'American Negro' exhibit, which in his words tried to 
present the issue of race with 'unprecedented honesty and integrity.' Both the Soviet and 
European press had circulated the Little Rock, Arkansas images and news of the previous 
year, and the Americans evidently felt that they could not ignore the issue. Whether the 
presentation was as courageous as Hixson claims is not clear on the evidence offered here. 
Perhaps he ascribes 'integrity' to the USIA because this section of the exhibition in 
particular aroused the anger of Southern congressmen: protests, however, that led the 
honorable USIA organizers to remove offending photos of 'mixed' couples or groups from 
the exhibition. The analysis of the US exhibition in 1959 in Moscow that secured the 
world's headlines because of Nixon and Khrushchev's carefully staged 'kitchen debate' 
rests on Hixson's own archival research both in the US and Russia. Here the People's 
Capitalism - the American Way of Life - was translated into an orgy of exhibited 
consumer goods, 'labor-saving' house appliances, cosmetics and hygienic products and, of 
course, automobiles. Carefully vetted young Americans served as guides to the various 
exhibits and personally sifted and fielded questions from the many visitors. Hixson reports 
USIA officials' self-congratulatory reports on this effective pedagogical strategy. They 
may well have picked up the idea from the communists. Any visitor to the USSR in those 
years will recall how hard it was to sneak out or see anything 'unaccompanied.' 
Hixson doesn't have much to say about American 'high' culture as propaganda, but 
mentions in passing that the Americans worried about Soviet criticism of vulgar American 
mass entertainment (including rock'n'roll). Accordingly both in Brussels and Moscow 
'modern' American art (e.g. abstract expressionist painting) was exhibited. There is some 
indication that the selection of 'modernist' art worried American organizers because of its 
potentially disturbing effects on the overall impression of the exhibition. Conservative 
Congressmen and corporate business executives tended to argue that there was little point 
in spending money on showing America's dirty linen abroad. Rather, they wanted 
American art which conveyed deep spiritual and national truths. Intermittently, Hixson's 
book offers fascinating snippets such as the above, the successful tour of Leonard 
I .  As far as I remember the signature tune of his regular 'Jazz Club USA' was 'Take the A-Train.' 
Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic, the earlier impact of the frequently-toured 
Porgy and Bess (presumably because of its large African-American cast), or pianist Van 
Cliburn's surprising, and apparently cult-like, success. But the thesis of his book, that with 
better funding and hence more clout the USIA could have even more successfully 
'penetrated' the Iron Curtain, and thus, perhaps, have ended the Cold War sooner and more 
cheaply, is not really persuasive. The USIA comes across as totally subservient to the State 
Department. 
But perhaps this is not what his book is really about. To a great extent, and as his 
concluding chapters also suggest, he intends a contribution to the rehabilitation of 
Eisenhower, who is presented as a man of good will and common-sense about how to 
serve US national interests best - but, unfortunately, also a weak man who let hard-liner 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have his way and who disastrously agreed to one 
last, fatal, U-2 spy plane flight. In Hixson's scenario Eisenhower blew the chance to go 
down in history as the statesman who initiated a ditente between East and West. Isn't this 
expecting a bit too much from the man who cowardly refused to stop the execution of the 
Rosenbergs? 
Christen K. Thomsen Odense University 
Poul Houe and Sven Hakon Rossel (eds), Images of America in Scandinavia (Amsterdam 
and Atlanta, Georgia: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1998), x + 232 pp. ISBN 90-420-0621-8, 
cloth, $66; 90-420-0611-0, paper, $20. 
Poul Houe and Sven Hakon Rossel deserve credit for giving us a timely and useful book 
that places itself in a tradition of scholarly study of the impact of the United States on 
Europe. This is a tradition where Scandinavian contributions have been of major 
significance, beginning with Halvdan Koht's The American Spirit in Europe in 1949. 
Much groundwork remains to be done, however, and scholars working in this fascinating 
yet problematic field are faced with the conflicting demands of making synthesizing and 
interpretive use of what has already been done and digging up the many basic yet still 
unknown pieces of information that are needed for an improved interpretation. The 
contributors demonstrate different approaches to this complex field of study. 
The volume is carefully designed. Tasks have been set and contributors selected. There 
are two articles each on Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; one on the impact of American 
literature and one on more general cultural and political responses to the United States. In 
addition Sven Rossel has written an introductory article on the image of the United States in 
Danish literature (with some comments on Denmark and Norway) and Poul Houe has 
written a concluding essay on three American novelists, Willa Cather, Ole Rolvaag, and 
Sophus Keith Winther, and the Swedish VilhelmMoberg. Some of his readings are valuable 
contributions, but his article is necessarily an appendix to the central theme. Iceland and 
Finland have not been included even though these countries would have provided 
fascinating perspectives given their different histories. What we have is an account of how 
Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes have looked at themselves in the American mirror. 
